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1  Introduction 
The hosting of the Olympic Games supposedly affects the regions involved in different 
ways – politically, psychologically, sociologically and culturally, as well as economi-
cally.
1 Applications to host the Olympic Games (or other so-called “mega-events”
2) by 
cities and regions are based, in as much as rational decision making may be presup-
posed, on the expectation that the corresponding benefits will exceed the costs.
3 As for 
the members of the International Olympic Committee (IOC) who decide which cities 
will host the Olympic Games, in recent years at least they have received an evaluation 
                                                 
∗   University of Hamburg, Department of Economics, Chair for Economic Policy, phone: 040 - 42838 – 
4628, fax: 040 - 42838 - 6251, feddersen@econ.uni-hamburg.de. 
1   See Ritchie and Yangzhou (1987), Hotchkiss, Moore and Zobey (2003) and Baade and Matheson 
(2002) for ex-post analysis of the economics of the Games of Atlanta 1996 and L.A. 1984 and the lit-
erature quoted therein for the corresponding ex-ante analysis. 
2   “Throughout the 1980s, World's Fairs and Olympic organizers turned to the mega-event as a panacea, 
a solution to the myriad of problems caused by economic hard times” (Tews 1993, p. 3, quoted in 
Baade and Matheson 2002, p. 129). 
3   See Spilling (1996, p. 321). For an overwiew on ex ante studies on the costs and benefits of the Olym-
pics cf. Preuss (2004, p. 45). Benefits may also occur in the case of failed applications. Thus the inter-
national application campaign may in part be seen as a relatively cheap form of image campaign (An-
dranovich, Burbank and Heying 2001, p. 127). For example, the value of Birmingham’s (unsuccessful) 
bid has been estimated at 25 million BP, although it only cost 5 milion BP (Roche 2001, p. 587). WP 02/2007 – How to Win the Olympic Games  2 
 
                                                
report which compares the most important determinants for the individual cities in ques-
tion. 
In spite of this assumed rationality both on the part of the applicants and of the decision-
makers, the process of deciding who will host the Olympic Games has so far attracted 
relatively little attention in economic analyses. Schauenberg (1992) analyses the voting 
procedure for the 1996 Olympic Games and reveals some irrationalities. Swart and Bob 
(2004) identify factors as accountability, political support, relationship marketing, abil-
ity, infrastructure, bid team composition, communication and exposure and existing 
facilities as decisive for a successful bid. However, these factors are not submitted to 
any econometric test. This limited attention is astonishing because – presumably as a 
consequence of the expected benefits – both the number of applicant cities and the re-
lated expenditure of resources have increased significantly.
4
This paper examines, in our opinion for the first time, the probability of success of ap-
plication campaigns to host the Olympic Summer Games
5 on the basis of quantified 
determinants. The analysis is based on a total of 43 bids to host the Olympic Summer 
Games between 1992 and 2012. Section 2 sketches the history of the bids and the 
awarding of the Games. Section 3 presents the data, the estimation model and the results 
of the econometric analysis. Section 4 closes with a conclusion. 
2 Some elements of the history of Olympic bids  
Table 1 provides an overview of the years and locations in which the Summer Olympic 
Games have been held, the year of the IOC’s bid decision and the other unsuccessful 
applicant cities. The figures are taken from Lyberg (1996, p. 252-260) as well as from 
our own updating research, in which only those cities are considered as applicants that 
actually featured in the voting process (or which withdrew their applications for what-
 
4   The application budget for LA 1984 was 158,000 US-$ (Andranovich, Burbank, Heying 2001, p. 118). 
The budget for London 2012 was 29.1 million BP, of which 1.4 million BP was not spent (N.N. 2005). 
5   The Olympic Winter Games have to be analysed separately given their particular climatic and topog-
raphic requirements. WP 02/2007 – How to Win the Olympic Games  3 
 
                                                
ever reasons shortly before the vote took place). Scherer (1995, p. 401) by contrast de-
parts from this approach and defines every city as an applicant that expressed its interest 
to the IOC to host the Olympics, and thus arrives at considerably higher numbers of 
applicants. 
With regard to the following analysis it appears meaningful to systematise the history of 
Olympic bids particularly according to the criterion of the absolute number of applicant 
cities (and the changes to this number) in the various phases, even if other systems, e.g. 
according to political and/or historical principles, also appear possible (cf. for example 
Guttmann 1992). 
In an initial phase from 1886 to the end of WW II the awarding of the Games was 
largely determined by the influence of the founders of the modern Olympics. A total of 
39 cities applied to host the 14 Olympic Games of the period. The second phase, which 
began after WW II and lasted until 1968, shows a significant rise in the numbers of ap-
plicant cities
6 and, with the decision in favour of Tokyo’s bid to host the 1964 Games, 
also includes for the first time an opening up of the club of host cities which had previ-
ously been limited to those from western cultural circles. The awarding of the 1968 
Games to Mexico City is partly regarded as an attempt by the IOC to avoid both the 
effects of the East-West conflict that had intensified during the Fifties and increasing 
damage from boycotts.
7 The 1964 Olympic Games in Tokyo, which were used to im-
prove sporting and general infrastructure to a previously unheard of degree and which 
also entailed considerable costs, initiated a process of rethinking among applicant cities 
(Greenberg 2003, p. 36). 
 
6   A total of 37 cities applied to host the six Olympic Games held in this phase. 
7   Cf. Liu (1998, p. 85). The Montreal Games were boycotted by the teams of 20 black African states in 
protest against the participation of New Zealand, whose national rugby team had visited South Africa 
(Greenberg 2003, p. 43). Following the Soviet Union’s invasion of Afghanistan 36 countries boycotted 
the 1980 Games in Moscow; a further 20 NOCs did not comment on the invitation (Schollmeier 2001, 
p. 23). Finally, seven socialist states refused to participate in the Los Angeles Games. For an overview 
of boycotts and exclusions as a means of political pressure that heavily influenced the Olympic Games 
from 1956 onwards, cf. Riordan, Lowe and Nikishkinov (1980).   WP 02/2007 – How to Win the Olympic Games  4 
 
                                                
The third phase from 1972 up to and including 1988
8 accordingly displays a degressive 
tendency in the number of applicants, which almost exclusively came from the industri-
ally more developed countries. Twelve bids by eight different cities were made for the 
five Olympic Games of this phase. This third phase can be characterised as displaying a 
limited intensity of competition to host the Olympic Games. The third phase did how-
ever influence competitive behaviour in phase 4, since the Games in Los Angeles and 
Seoul were regarded as financially successful and induced a rise in the number of appli-
cants. The end of the East-West conflict from the late Eighties meant that the Olympic 
Games have since hardly been used as a political instrument at all. The applicant cities 
have accordingly once again been able to hope for greater image gains from the Olym-
pics. 
Phase 5 begins with the revelation of the IOC corruption scandal of Salt Lake City and 
with the awarding of the 2008 Olympic Games in the year 2001. The repercussions of 
the scandal led to fundamental changes
9 which, with the division of the application 
process into two phases (the “applicant city phase” and the “candidate city phase”) were 
intended to provide greater transparency. In addition the IOC, under its new president 
Jacques Rogge, has set itself the target of reducing the costs and the size of the Olympic 
Games (Waldbröl 2003). A further increase in the numbers of applicants hoping to host 
the two Olympic Games in this fifth phase from 2008 to – so far – 2012, can be seen in 
comparison with the previous phases. The nineteen bids for the two Olympic Summer 
Games make it evident that the Olympic Games are currently enjoying greater popular-
ity than ever before among applicant cities. 
Illustration 1 summarizes the development of the numbers of applicants in the five 
phases. The upwards trend in applicant numbers in the second phase can be seen clearly, 
with more than double the number of applicants per Olympic Games than in the first 
 
8   The period of time between the vote on the host city and the hosting of the Games, which is not con-
stant over the history of the Games and which can be up to seven years, should be taken into account 
here and in the following. 
9   For a description and an economic analysis of corruptive process around Salt Lake City and the institu-
tional changes afterwards Maennig (2002).  WP 02/2007 – How to Win the Olympic Games  5 
 
phase. The degressive development in bid numbers in the third phase and the renewed 
rise in bid numbers since the fourth phase are also clearly noticeable. WP 02/2007 – How to Win the Olympic Games  6 
 
Table 1: History of Olympic bids  































































Amsterdam/ Barcelona/ Los Angeles/ Prague/ 
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Baltimore/ Lausanne/ Los Angeles/  
Minneapolis/ Philadelphia  
Amsterdam/ Chicago/ Detroit/ Los Angeles/  
Minneapolis/Philadelphia  
Buenos Aires/ Chicago/ Detroit/ Los Angeles/ 
Mexico City/ Minneapolis/ Philadelphia/ San 
Francisco  
Berlin/ Buenos Aires
a/ Los Angeles/ Paris/ Rio de 
Janeiro  
Brussels/ Budapest/ Detroit/ Lausanne/ Mexico 
City/ Tokyo  
Brussels/ Detroit/ Vienna  

















Detroit/ Madrid/ Montreal  
Los Angeles/ Moscow  






















Amsterdam/ Belgrade/ Birmingham/ Brisbane/ 
Paris  
Athens/ Belgrade/ Manchester/ Melbourne/ To-
ronto  




Buenos Aires/ Istanbul/ Cape Town/ Lille/ Rio de 












Toronto/ Paris/ Istanbul/ Osaka/ Bangkok/ Cairo/ 
Havanna/ KualaLumpur/ Seville  
Paris/ Madrid/ New York/ Moscow/ Leipzig/ Is-
tanbul/ Rio de Janeiro/ Havanna  
Source:  Lyberg (1996); Schollmeier (2001); authors’ own research. 
Notes: 
a  The application was withdrawn shortly before the deciding vote; 
b The city was chosen first; 
c The Olympic Games in 1916, 1940 and 1944 were not held due to the First and Second WP 02/2007 – How to Win the Olympic Games  7 
World Wars; 
d The horse-riding competitions of the 1952 Olympics were held separately due 
to Australia’s strict regulations covering animal imports. 



































3 Data, methods and results 
3.1 Data 
The analysis of the characteristics of successful Olympic bids is based on the bids for 
the six Olympic Games from 1992 to 2012.
10 The data for the empirical analysis is fun-
damentally taken from the bid books of the cities in question as well as from the reports 
of the IOC Evaluation Commission and relate to the year in which the IOC made the 
decision. In the case of incomplete data or macroeconomic data not included in the bid 
documentation, data from the World Bank was used. In cases in which the data pro-
 
                                                 
10  The bids prior to the 1992 Games provide a significantly lower amount of information. WP 02/2007 – How to Win the Olympic Games  8 
 
                                                
vided by the bid books and the IOC Evaluation Commission differed, the latter source 
was used, since bid books sometimes tend to provide “embellished” information.
11  
The following empirical analysis makes use on the one hand of the factors for a success-
ful bid as identified by Swart and Bob (2004), which can be quantified using the avail-
able data. To measure political support the results of public opinion polls conducted in 
the cities in question were used (SUPPORT). This data is taken from the bid books 
and/or from the IOC Evaluation Commission reports. The quantification of existing 
facilities took into account the extent to which the construction of the sporting venues 
had progressed. The proportion of completed venues requiring no further modification 
(COMP-READY), the venues requiring substantial reconstruction work or still under 
construction (IN-PROGRESS), as well as planned venues that would only be built on 
approval of the bid (PLANNED) was calculated in relation to the total of the Olympic 
sporting facilities mentioned in the bid books and the IOC reports. The number of avail-
able hotel beds within 50 minutes travelling time (BEDS) was taken from the bid 
books.
12 Table 2 presents the average and median values of the data used. 
Following the data requested by IOC (2004), the influencing factors were supplemented 
by additional variables on the sporting venue concept, the climatic situation and a num-
ber of socio-economic determinants. With regard to the sporting venue concept, vari-
ables on the operationalisation and quantification of the applicant cities’ sporting con-
cept were added. The average distance of the sporting venues from the Olympic Village 
in kilometres (DISTANCE), the number of planned Olympic Villages (NR OLYMP 
VILL) and the planned accommodation capacities of the Olympic Villages (CAP 
OLYMP VILL) were taken from the bid books and/or the IOC reports. 
 
11  “What is written in the bid documents soon turns out to be pretty irrelevant.” (N.N. 2004) who also 
points out one of the most recent cases of failing to keep the promises made in the bid books: shortly 
after approval of its bid for the 2010 Games, Vancouver decided to relocate the speed skating oval – 
initially planned for the city center – to the waterfront. The International Broadcast Center was also to 
be relocated. Assuming rational decision-making processes on the part of the IOC members, the re-
duced validity of the bid book data should tend to lead to a limitation in the information content of the 
data, which has to be taken into account below when interpreting the results. 
12   The IOC demands a minimum capacity of 40,000 beds (IOC 2004a, p. 57). In those cases in which the 
accommodation capacities in the bid books were cited via numbers of hotel rooms, this figure was 
multiplied by a factor of 1.8. Cf. Lexington (2002, p. 91) for a justification of this conversion factor. WP 02/2007 – How to Win the Olympic Games  9 
 
The national purchasing-power-adjusted per capita GDP (GDP) as defined by the World 
Bank was included as a socio-economic determinant and adjusted for inflation based on 
the year 1995 in US-$. In addition the unemployment rate (UR) and the inflation rate 
(INFL) were also tested. The population size of the applicant country (pop) was also 
included, which can be regarded as an indicator for its political power. 
Finally, in order to take climatic aspects into account, the average temperature (TEMP) 
and relative humidity (HUMID) during the period envisaged for the Games were also 
taken into consideration. This data was taken from the bid books of the cities in ques-
tion and the Evaluation Commission reports. 
Table 2: Descriptive Statistics 
    Successful bids  Unsuccessful bids
Mean 15,143  13,180  GDP  
(in US$1995; PPP)  Median 13,565 14,438 
Mean 10.9  10.0  Unemployment rate  
(in %)  Median 10.7  8.7 
Mean 4.2  25.0  Rate of inflation  
(in %)  Median 4.3  4.3 
Mean 90.0  78.5 
Public support (in %) 
Median 90.0  80.5 
Mean 12.07 16.72  Distance of the sporting 
venues to the Olympic 
Village (in km)  Median 9.44  16.38 
Mean  52.8 44.9  Completed Venues  
(in %)  Median  50.0 43.5 
Mean  21.2 24.5  Venues under  
construction  
(in %)  Median  16.7 20.5 
Mean  26.0 30.4  Planned venues 
(in %)  Median  26.0 30.8 
Mean 91,500  67,613  Accommodation capac-
ity (in hotel beds)  Median 88,308 49,115 
Source: The Worldbank Group (2004), IOC (1986, 1990, 1993, 1997, 2001, 2004a), 
United Nations Development Programme (2004), Bidding Committees of the 
Cities, authors’ own calculations. WP 02/2007 – How to Win the Olympic Games  10 
 
3.2 Methods and results 
Binary logistical regression can suitably analyse the yes/no decisions that determine 
whether an applicant city’s bid is successful or not (Bühl and Zöfel 2000, p. 354). In 
view of the large number of potential influencing factors and the limited number of ob-
servations, the method of forward selection was used here, in which by referring ini-
tially only to the constant, those variables were successively included which display the 
highest explanatory value for the dependent variable. This method also incidentally 
takes any problems of multicollinearity into account. In view of the small sample the 
criterion for the inclusion of the independent variables was set to 0.1. Table 3 illustrates 
that the process of determination of the regression equation can already be broken off 
after the fourth step. The four variables that, in accordance with the chi-square distrib-
uted Wald statistic, have a significant influence on a bid’s chances of success are the 
average distance of the sporting venues to the Olympic Village (Distance), the unem-
ployment rate (UR), the average temperature (TEMP) as well as the national population 
size (POP). 
Table 3: Results  
  βi
Standard 
error  Wald  Sig.  Exp (Bi) 
UNEMPLOYM  0.231 0.124 3.438 0.064 1.259 
DISTANCE  -0.440 0.215 4.203 0.040 0.644 
TEMP  0.458 0.235 3.797 0.051 1.581 
POP  0.000 0.000 4.173 0.041 1.000 
CONSTANT -10.108  6.088 2.757 0.097 0.000 
Source: Authors’ own calculations. 
The effect coefficients in column 6 of Table 3 indicate with Exp (Bi) > 1 for the vari-
ables unemployment and temperature their positive influence on the probability of being WP 02/2007 – How to Win the Olympic Games  11 
 
                                                
awarded the Olympic Games.
13 For unemployment this is initially surprising. Seen 
against the background of the high unemployment rates prevalent in the cities of Barce-
lona (18.0 %), Athens (19.0 %) and Sydney (10.7 %) at the time they were awarded the 
Games, this result becomes easier to understand. Applicant cities with employment 
problems possibly put particularly intensive effort into acquiring the Olympic Games. 
As for the temperatures, it must be emphasised explicitly that the information gleaned 
from the quasi-linear relationship relates to the range of the data used here (and not, for 
example, to significantly higher temperatures in cities and periods of time, for which no 
bids exist). Non-linear relationships may result from the inclusion of temperatures that 
go beyond the scope of the applicant cities 1996 until 2012. The effect coefficient Bi = 1 
for the size of population means that the probability of a successful bid does not change 
with the size of the population. 
In addition to the effects of the individual determinants the overall explanatory power of 
the model is also of interest. In order to assess the goodness of fit of our model we may 
use the Chi
2-distributed difference of the negatively doubled values of the logarithm of 
the likelihood function of the (above-described final) estimation model (–2LLfin =17.3) 
and the model that only contains the constant (–2LLconst =30.9) which is shown as sig-
nificant (Bühl and Zöfel 2000, p. 357). According to Nagelkerke’s measure the ex-
plained variance stands at 52.8 % (Diaz-Bone and Künemund 2003, p. 13). 
A further test of the goodness of fit of an estimated logistical model results from the 
evaluation of the success of the prognosis. The classification table shown in Table 4 
illustrates the overall explanatory power provided by the current regression model. The 
model correctly predicts the result of the application process in 93 % of cases. This high 
figure is however relativised by the fact that whilst the model was able to predict failure 
in over 97 % of cases, it was only able to correctly predict success in 60 % of cases. The 
model thus achieves a high degree of explanatory power in particular due to the high 
level of unsuccessful bids (38 of 43 cases) (Hosmer and Lemeshow 1989, p. 146 et 
seq.). 
 
13  On the validity and interpretation of effect coefficients cf. for example Urban (1993, p. 12). WP 02/2007 – How to Win the Olympic Games  12 
 
Table 4: Prognosis value of the estimation model 
Predicted by the model 






decision  37 1  97.4 
IOC decisions 
Positive  
decision  2 3  60.0 
Total      93.0 
Source: Authors’ own calculations. 
This discrepancy might be explained by the fact that the determinants analysed here 
quantified the necessary conditions for success, but not, as yet, the sufficient conditions. 
Applicants that fail to adequately fulfil these criteria can be determined to have poor 
chances of success. If an applicant city fulfils all the necessary conditions the other un-
quantified historical, political,
14 psychological and application campaign related factors 
hinted at by Swart and Bob (2004) may play an important role. It will be task for future 
analyses to empirically test the role of the quality of the cities’ presentations before the 
IOC plenum, the personal preferences of the IOC-members,
15 lobbyism and the poten-
tially more problematic forms of gaining influence. 
4 Conclusion 
The number of bids for the Summer Olympics has risen significantly since the eco-
nomic successes of the Games in L.A. in 1984 and Seoul in 1988. At the same time the 
expenditure of resources on the bid campaigns has also risen. This paper examines the 
probabilities of success of bid campaigns on the basis of quantified determinants. The 
analysis is based on a total of 43 bids for the Summer Olympics between 1996 and 
2012. 
                                                 
14  Historical aspects could have played a role in the case of Athens 2004, whilst political effects may 
have been of significance in the case of Peking 2008. 
15  These preferences must not correspond to the continental origins of the IOC members, cf. Swart and 
Bob (2004) for the case of Cape Town’s bid for the 2004 Games. WP 02/2007 – How to Win the Olympic Games  13 
 
The average distance of the sports venues to the Olympic Village (distance) has a sig-
nificantly negative influence on chances of success. The average temperatures in the 
host cities during the Olympic Games has a positive influence, whereby it must be em-
phasised that the information provided by the quasi-linear relationship relates to the 
range of the data used here (and not, for example, to significantly higher temperatures in 
cities and periods of time, for which no bids exist). The equally significantly positive 
influence of unemployment could stem from the particularly intensive effort put into 
acquiring the Olympic Games on the part of applicant cities with employment problems. 
The variable “unemployment” thus might possibly be a proxy variable for another hith-
erto unquantified variable that measures the “bid pressure” in the applicant cities. 
The analysis of the goodness of fit showed that with around 97 % of predictions correct 
the model used was considerably more accurate in predicting unsuccessful bids than 
successful ones (60%). Future works that provide better models of successful bids could 
also quantify and take into consideration historical, political, psychological and bid 
campaign related factors. 
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